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*Russell, Richard (Sen)*

Is CIA Trying To Run State Dept. ?--II

*CIA 8.02*

*CIA 1.01 Helms*

*Richard*

# SENATORS STRUGGLE TO GAIN CONTROL

By CLAYTON FRITCHEY

THE general uneasiness about the CIA in Congress was naturally stimulated by these disclosures. So much so that many thought Senator Russell might accept the proposal for adding three members of the Foreign Relations Committee to the Secret Seven, either by formal Senate vote or an informal arrangement.

Not at all. Not for a minute. No greater supervision over the CIA was required, Russell argued. His group was already diligently monitoring the agency, and was fully informed on all vital matters. He insinuated that the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, which is probably the Senate's most distinguished committee, could not be trusted to the same degree as his group. Russell insisted the Secret Seven had never leaked anything.

"Anytime you add one member to the subcommittee, he said, 'you increase the chance of leaks.'"

Russell himself destroyed the argument that he and the

Secret Seven were always adequately briefed on critical matters affecting the national security. Speaking in the Senate on another matter, Russell absently confessed that he knew little about the CIA plan to invade Cuba, which President Kennedy regarded as the greatest mistake of his Administration. "I only wish I had been consulted," said Russell, "because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been." The CIA not only did not consult the watchdog group, it did not even design to inform them. The pity is that if Russell had been properly briefed, and had then advised against the invasion, it might never have occurred, for Russell carried great weight with a President who already was very dubious about going ahead.

The Georgian's admission also tended to confirm the charge that one reason his group never leaked anything was because the CIA never earlier substantiated by Senator Leverett Salt on staff of Massachusetts, a member of the



CIA Chief Richard Helms.

Secret Seven. "The difficulty in asking questions (of the Director) and getting information" he said, "is that we might obtain information which I personally would rather not have, unless it was essential for me as a member of Congress to have it. There are those who think the secret, furtive and constitutionally unauthorized invasion of another country might be essential information."

Senator Fulbright also took note of the assertion that the

CIA is under close, continuous supervision, of the National Security and initiates no action on order of the Council. Fulbright said that in fact the NSC had met on May 9, 1957, for the first time since July 1965, and that the former machinery of the NSC "has atrophied to the point of non-existence, nobody even tried to rebut this indictment. The 'Sub-committee'?"

Fulbright was not pressing for a victory over Russell. He was, in fact, agreeable to any formula which would enable his committee to keep up with CIA affairs. Indeed, an alternative to reaching the Secret Seven, Fulbright explored the possibility of setting up a small Foreign Relations sub-committee to deal separately with the CIA. All that this required was the cooperation of the Director, who then was Vice-Admiral William F. Raborn, but the Admiral informed Chairman Fulbright that the CIA could not confidentially brief members of his committee as it does the Russell group. "The Director could not have brushed off the powerful Foreign